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in LatinAmerica
Politics,Policies,andPoverty
Fribble,EvelyneHuber,andJohnD. Stephens
Jennifer

has longbeenrecognizedas one of themostseriousand lastingproblemsfacPoverty
ing LatinAmerica.Recentdata fromtheUnitedNations'EconomicCommissionon
LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(ECLAC) showthat41.7 percentof LatinAmericans
in2004,while17.4percentlivedinextreme
livedinpoverty
poverty.1
Despitethisgenthereis significant
variation
erallyhighlevelofpoverty,
amongLatinAmericanstates.
variedfroma lowof 15.4perIndeed,in2002 theshareofindividuals
livinginpoverty
centin Uruguayto a highof77.3 percentin Honduras(see Table I).2 Thesedifferences
butalso existforindicators
of basic-needs
are notexclusiveto income-based
poverty
In thisvein,ECLAC estimates
thatabout29 percentoftheNicaraguanpopulapoverty.
in the late 1990s, while only two percentof Argentines
tion was undernourished
In short,variation
in theprevalenceand infromthesamenutrition
suffered
problem.3
in LatinAmericais striking
of poverty
and pointsto an important
puzzle:why
tensity
in theirabilityto protectcitizensfrom
do countriesexhibitsuch starkdifferences
imposedby
fallingintopoverty?Put differently,
why,despitethesimilarconstraints
in the
and
late
do
countries
unstable
industrialization,
political
regimes,
globalization,
in
to
their
to
reduce
This
article
seeks
to
find
an
answer
this
ability
poverty?
regionvary
attention
to
the
issue
of
how
a
state's
politicsshapes
abilityto
question,payingspecial
reducepoverty.
This focus on the role of politics-politicalregimetype,parties,and state- buildson a growingbodyof researchaboutthepoliticaleconprovidedsocialpolicy
American
Thisnewlineof investigation
has begunto moveaway
of
Latin
omy
poverty.
Consensus'nearlyexclusivefocuson the impactof economic
fromtheWashington
on poverty
reduction
andtowarda morenuancedviewoftheachievement
ofsogrowth
Attheheightoftheneoliberal
cial welfare.
economists
and
Consensus,
polWashington
stressedthatLatinAmerica'shighpovertylevelswerelargelytheresultof
icymakers
Thisexplanation
slowgrowth.4
gainedsupportin thewakeof the 1982 debtcrisisand
1
the
whoarwas maintained
technocrats,
throughout 990s bynationalandinternational
of"inthat
Latin
America's
economic
was
the
result
of
decades
performance
gued
poor
rate
and a
efficient"
economicpolicyin theformof tradebarriers,
controls,
exchange
sector.
the
Consensus
of
Proponents
Washington
encouragedgovernments
largepublic
withtheaim of boostingeconomicgrowth.
This growthin
to liberalizetheirmarkets
suchas increasedemployment
GDP was expectedto haveautomaticspill-over
effects,
In essence,technocrats
andpoverty
reduction.
suggestedthat,withtheproperreforms,
387
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Table 1 Poverty
Ratesin LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean2000 to 2002
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
CostaRica
DominicanRepublic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

45.4
62.4
37X~
2072~
54.9
20.3
44.9
49.0
48.9
60.2
77.3
39.4
69.3
34.0
61.0
5Ï8
15.4
48.6

Average2000-02
Averageall country
years
1Othpercentile
all country
years
90thpercentile
all country
years

46.9
39.2
16.6
65.0

Cell entries
wholivebelowtheECLAC-established
arethepercentage
ofindividuals
line,most
poverty
recent
dateavailable.

countriesin the regioncould "grow" themselvesout of poverty.In this way,the
Consensuspainteda pictureof LatinAmericanpovertyin whichpolitics
Washington
topolitical
was ofmarginal
andthepolicyprescriptions
importance,
paidlittleattention
factors
thatmediatetheeffects
ofgrowth
on poverty.
This view of povertyreductionbeganto be challengedin thelate 1990s,when
afterseveralyearsof steadygrowthin LatinAmericamanycountries
continued
to lag
behindin povertyreduction.The puzzle presentedby the coexistenceof economic
a revisionof themostorthodoxversions
growthand highlevelsof poverty
prompted
of theWashington
Consensus.Indeed,severalnew studiesstressedtheimportance
of
publicpolicy in determining
povertylevels. This new policy-oriented
approachto
financialinstitutions,
such as the
povertyreductionwas supportedby international
WorldBank,anda new"humancapital"approachto poverty
reduction
beganto attract
attention.5
Whilethisnew approachto povertyreductionrecognizesthe important
role of
ineducationandhealthcare,
investment
itstillpaysrelatively
publicpolicy,particularly
388
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littleattentionto domesticpolitical factorssuch as the natureof parties,regime
structure
of thestate.This neglectof politicaldifferences
type,and theinstitutional
in politicalregimetypeand partisan
is
differences
countries
shortsighted;
among
on
cross-national
variationin Latin American
effect
ideologyhave an important
poverty.6
aboutthepoliticaldeterminants
of povertyagainst
This articletestshypotheses
variablesusingan unbalancedpooled timeseries
economicand sociodemographic
and sizable
thatpoliticshavea significant
design.The analysisconfirms
expectations
on poverty
levelsin theregion.In particular,
effect
politicalregimetypeandthepartiof povertylevels.The studyalso
san balanceof powerare bothsignificant
predictors
of effective
educationpolicyin promoting
findsstrongsupportforthe importance
reduction.
poverty
Povertyin LatinAmerica:PreviousFindingsand Hypotheses
Althoughtheeffectof politicson povertylevels in LatinAmericahas notbeen exstatistical
research,severalsmall-nstudiessuggestthatpoliploredin cross-national
in explainingvariationin the region.Weyland,forexample,finds
tics is important
thatfragmentation
ofthestate,weakparties,andproblemsofbureaucratic
politicshave
andinequalityin Brazil.7
to improvesocialoutcomes,suchas poverty
slowedattempts
and opponents
Huberfindsthatthebalance of powerbetweensupporters
Similarly,
in politicalinstitutions
and thedegreeof powerconcentration
of neoliberalreforms
explainvariationin LatinAmericanstates'social policyreformpathsin theneoliberalera.8Finally,a recentstudyabouteconomicand social progressin LatinAmerica
has profoundeffectson the quality
findsthatthe design of politicalinstitutions
and natureof policy outputsin the region,includingpolicies relatedto poverty
reduction.9
thatpoliticsplaysa keyrole in
thereis good reasonto hypothesize
Accordingly,
in
American
levels.A country's
differences
Latin
cross-national
popoverty
determining
is of fundamental
itshistorical
recordwithdemocracy,
liticalregimetype,specifically
is
in determining
levels.Severalstudieshavefoundthatdemocracy
poverty
importance
less
that
democracies
do
not
exhibit
for
the
argues
poor.10Ross, by contrast,
good
for
andcorrects
thanauthoritarian
poverty
regimesifone considersnonincome
poverty
data
from
authoritarian
thesamplingbias generated
Despite
governments.11
bymissing
thatdemocraciesin theLatinAmericanregionoffer
Ross' evidence,it is hypothesized
forseveralreasons.First,democthannondemocracies
better
protection
againstpoverty
to theneedsof theirpopulationbecausetheycan be
raticleadersare moreresponsive
fortheiractions.Second,withveryfewexceptions
heldaccountable
(Cuba,whichis not
under
theSandinistas,
in thedata set used herebecauseof data problems,
Nicaragua
PeruunderVelasco,PanamaunderTorrijos,and Ecuadorundera short-lived
military
389
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thealternative
to democratic
government),
regimesin LatinAmericahas beenauthoritarianregimesoftheright,
notoftheleft.
Democracyprovidesa settingin whichunderprivileged
groupsenjoygreaterfreedomsto organize,mobilize,and demandprotection
butitdoes notenagainstpoverty,
A keyfactorthatlinksdemocracy
surethatthesecitizenswillprosper.
to improved
welfareoutcomesis theeffective
of
the
interests
of
sectors.
representation
underprivileged
In LatinAmerica,partiesthatrepresent
theinterests
ofexcludedsectorshavebeenable
to consolidateand achievemajorlegislativerepresentation
onlyunderprolongedfully
democratic
rule.Underauthoritarian
and
semidemocracies
alike,partiesderegimes
the
interests
of
the
suffered
less
or
fending
privileged
repression exclusion.Thus,
the
the
creation
of
thatrepresent
their
democracy
helps poorbyallowing
organizations
interests.
The effect,
will
in
be
situations
of
sustaineddemocratic
however,
strongest
valueofthevariable.
rule,andthusthisstudymeasuresthecumulative
In additionto democracy,
the impactof different
kindsof authoritarianism
on
is considered
in thisarticle.One basic distinction
is betweenpopulistand conpoverty
servative
theotherone is betweenmildlyandhighlyrepressive
authorauthoritarianism;
itarianregimes.Forinstance,
thePeruvianmilitary
regimeunderVelascofrom1968to
1975was somewhat
Itintroduced
redistributive
populistandwas verymildlyrepressive.
allowedfewhumanrightsviolations,and let popularorganizations
flourish.
reforms,
Others,such as the conservativeand highlyrepressivebureaucratic-authoritarian
and Chile,redistributed
incomeupwardsand killed,tortured,
and
regimesinArgentina
incarcerated
thousandsof theircitizens,particularly
leadersof theleft,orgatargeting
nizedlabor,andothersocialmovements.
It is therefore
thatextendedrule
hypothesized
authoritarian
Yetthiseffectis expectedto bebyrepressive
regimesincreasespoverty.
of therepressive
one. In
gin to fadeafterthereplacement
regimewitha democratic
otherwords,theeffectoften yearsof repressiveauthoritarian
rule in the 1960s on
inthe1990swillbe weakerthantheeffect
oftenyearsofrepressive
authoritarpoverty
ianruleinthe1980s.
An additionalpoliticalfactorexpectedto influencepovertyis thedistribution
of
powerbetweendifferent
politicalparties.In LatinAmericathereis evidenceto suggest
thatleft-wing
welfarepolicies,bothtransfers
and services,to benefit
partiesstructure
lowerincomegroupsinparticular.
Thispointis important
to stressbecausecriticshave
oftenaccusedleftpartiesofdefending
ofa "laboraristocracy."
While
onlytheinterests
severalleftpartiesin theregiondo havetiesto labororganizations,
theyhavealso fain primaryand secondaryeducationand effective
voredinvestment
access to free
healthcare
forthelowestincomegroups.Thisemphasisamongleftpartiesis evidentin
boththeexpansionary
phaseof LatinAmericanwelfarepolicyand duringthecontemporaryneoliberalera.
The policiesof Chile'sUnidadPopular(UP) government
between1970 and 1973
offeran exampleof howleftpartiesresponded
to theneedsof thepoorduringtheexpansionphase of welfarepolicy.One of the UP's earlyreformsprovidednutrition
390
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andnursing
mothers
oftheirlabormarket
status.The
servicesto all pregnant
regardless
197
1971and
universal
1.12
Between
was
verysuccessful,
achieving
coverageby
policy
extended
thenutrition
to
cover
all
school
chilfurther
1973theUP government
program
milk
a
half
liter
of
each
of
drenbetweensixandfourteen
dayto
years age,administering
Another
of
the
focus
of
left
the
example
pro-poor
partiesduring exneedystudents.13
can be observedin the
phaseof LatinAmericansocial policydevelopment
pansionary
creationof Costa Rica's nationalhealthcare
systemin theearly1960s.In thisinstance,
Partidode LiberaciónNacional(PLN) was thecrucialactorin generattheleft-leaning
accesstohealthcare.
thatuniversalized
legislation
ingandapproving
era include
Examplesof thepro-poorfocusof leftpartiesin thecontemporary
whichincreasedsocialspendingparticuChile'scenter-left
Concertacion
governments,
to a dramaticdecreasein povertylevels.
larlyforeducationand health,contributing
theFrenteAmplio,createda newsocial assistance
Morerecently,
Uruguay'sleftparty,
Social), whichseeksto expandthe
(Plan deAtendonNacionalde Emergência
program
thathavebeenleftoutofother
coverageofsocialassistanceto sectorsofthepopulation
thecommitBrazilianWorker's
The left-leaning
Partyhas also demonstrated
programs.
sectorsby
leftto expandingcoverageto underprivileged
mentof thecontemporary
increasingthe fundingforsocial assistanceto familiesthatdo not have access to
benefits.14
employment-based
Theseexamplessuggestthat,whileLatinAmerica'sleftpartieswereandcontinue
withregardto thestrength
of
fromtheirEuropeancounterparts
to be quitedifferent
nonetheless
demoncharacter
of
their
have
and
the
base,
they
linkages
programmatic
thepoor.In lightof
in structuring
socialpolicyin a waythatbenefits
an interest
strated
thata balanceof powerthatfavorstheleftwill havea
thisevidence,it is hypothesized
democraciesgranta great
on poverty.
SinceLatinAmerica'spresidential
effect
negative
coaliand
deal of powerto theexecutivein initiating
legal proposals
buildingreform
andtheexecutivebranchesofgoverntions,thebalanceofpowerinboththelegislative
levels.
mentis expectedto influence
poverty
The partisanbalance of poweris not the onlypoliticalfactorthatmay affect
and thedesignof social welfareproStudiessuggestthatspendingpatterns
poverty.
to rein
Government
efforts
levels
Latin
America.15
have
an
on
impact poverty
grams
Social
into
two
services
and
transfers.
fall
duce poverty
services,
categories:
generally
workto reducepoverty
and indigenceby improving
suchas educationand healthcare,
of skilllevelsand lifechances.
humancapitaland creatinga moreequal distribution
and thusproas rightsof citizenship
suchservicesare oftendistributed
Furthermore,
Forthepurposeof this
vide bettercoverageforall sectorsof societythantransfers.16
to as healthand education.Of course,
thiscategoryof spendingwillbe referred
study,
in healthand
of sustainedinvestment
a
record
of
human
capitalrequires
improvement
medium
and
inreducing
over
the
educationandwillbe effective
longrun.
poverty
only
needs
to
be
of
on
these
thecumulative
Therefore,
analyzed,
programs
average spending
on poverty
is expected.
anda negativeeffect
391
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An important
critiqueofsocialspendingin LatinAmerica,ofcourse,has beenthat
or excessivepublicemit is ofteninefficient
and poorlytargeted.
corruption
Outright
results.
This problemaffects
on
desired
of
reduce
the
impact spending
may
ployment
and services.Indeed,theallocationof healthand educationspendingto
bothtransfers
levelsthan
tertiary
schoolingand expensivecurativemedicinewill do less forpoverty
a moredirectmeasure
healthcare.
inbasiceducationandprimary
investment
Therefore,
of educationpolicy,averageyearsof educationof thepopulation,is
of theefficiency
of educationpolicy,and it is
included.This measureis a good proxyof theefficiency
effect
on
to
have
a
poverty.
expected
negative
The use of averageyearsof educationas a proxymeasureof policyeffectiveness
theaveragenumberofyearsof
The variable,whichreports
requiressomeexplanation.
and older,providesinsightintohow longchileducationforadultsaged twenty-five
is a significant
Schoolabandonment
drenstayin schoolina givencountry.
problemin
LatinAmerica;a 2002 ECLAC studyfoundthatin LatinAmerica'surbanareas more
thepriwhodropoutofschoolwithout
thanhalfofthenumberofchildren
completing
The
reasons
of
the
income
distribution.17
25
to
the
bottom
percent
marycyclebelong
butpublicpolicyresearchrevealsthattheway
are manifold,
forschoolabandonment
whether
ornotchildrencompletetheir
inwhicheducationalfundsarespentinfluences
In
finds
that
ECLAC
increasingtheprovisionof preschool
schooling.18 particular,
and/orexpandingtargetedsubsidiesto highriskschools,creeducation,introducing
the accessibilityof schools are all
atingconditionalcash benefits,and improving
in dropoutratesamongpoor students.19
to a reduction
policiesthathave contributed
toPutdifferently,
theECLAC studyrevealsthatstateswhichdirecteducationfunding
will expandtheyearsof schoolingamonglow income
wardcertaintypesof programs
thevariableaverageyearsofeducationoftheadultpopulationis a
students.
Therefore,
ofeducationspendingin a givencountry.20
moredirectmeasureoftheeffectiveness
outcomesis theissue
ofeducationon poverty
One challengeinanalyzingtheeffect
couldresultin lowereducationlevelsbesincehighlevelsof poverty
of endogeneity
outof schoolearly.To addressthis
cause poorfamiliesaremorelikelyto pullchildren
witha sizabletimelag is used,
a measureofeducationthatis operationalized
problem,
is tested.We use Barroand
of interest
thusensuringthattheparticular
relationship
and
Lee's measureof averageyearsof educationof thepopulationaged twenty-five
older,whichassesses how coverageof educationin thepast affectscurrent
poverty
Thistimelag meansthatitis logicallyimpossibleforreversecausationto exist
levels.21
sincecurrent
levelscannotpredictpasteducationexperiences.
poverty
is theprovision
A secondsetofpoliciesthatcountries
employto addresspoverty
Forthemostpart,
to needyindividuals/households.
of subsidiesor transfer
payments
and thusrecipients
mustparticipate
thesebenefitsaretiedto payrollcontributions
(or
in thepast) in the formallabormarket.Recentevidencesuggests
have participated
social insurancein Latin
thatpension spendingand othertypes of contributory
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Americaare regressive
becauseonlyformalsectorworkersenjoyaccess to thebenefitsand because benefitsare earnings-related.22
Manycountriesin theregionalso
cash
transfers.
Sinceroughly
halfofLatin
offersomeformofnoncontributory
(targeted)
in
in theinformal
informal
and
because
the
Americanworkersfunction
sector,
wages
it is likelythatnoncontributory
sectortendto be lowerthanthoseof formalworkers,
formof incomesupportforfamiliesat
cashtransfers
arethemostimportant
(targeted)
theverybottomoftheincomedistribution.
data on social welfarespendingin LatinAmericado not distinUnfortunately,
benefitsand lumpall transfer
and noncontributory
payguishbetweencontributory
the
mentsintoone category:social securityand welfareexpenditure.
Traditionally,
bulkof LatinAmericantransfer
Therefore,
spendinghas beenallocatedto pensions.23
of theeffectof social security
and welfareexpenditure
consideration
essentiallycapturestheimpactof pensionspendingon povertyoutcomes.In lightof theevidence
thatLatinAmerica'spensionsystemsare highlyinequitable,theirabilityto reduce
povertyon averageis doubtful.If, however,the size of the informalsectoris conandwelfareexpenditures
trolled,
maywellhavea negativeeffect
highersocial security
It can be assumedthatcontrolling
forthesize oftheinformal
sectorintroon poverty.
fortheshareof social security
and welfareexpenditures
ducessomeroughcorrection
benefits.Moreover,even familieswithformal
thatis accountedforby contributory
sectorworkerscan fallbelow thepovertyline. Indeed,in some countriesfamilyallowancestiedto formalsectoremployment
helphouseholdswithseveralchildrenstay
abovethepovertyline; and noncontributory
pensions,althoughgenerallylowerthan
to the incomeof householdswithelderlymembersand
thepovertyline,contribute
mayraise combinedhouseholdincomeabove thepovertyline.The same is truefor
to familieswithchildren.In lightofthiscontraconditional
transfers
noncontributory
and welfarespendabouttheeffectof social security
dictoryevidence,thehypothesis
levels
is
nondirectional.
on
poverty
ing
of poverty
offered
hereinvolvestheconfluIn summary,
thepoliticalexplanation
and policydeenceofthreeseparatefactors:regimetype,partisanpowerdistribution,
in
to
lower
levelsof
a
chain
of
events
that
is
result
The
expected
theoryspecifies
sign.
with
involves
an
extensive
The
sequence
experience
democracy,
poverty. ideal-typical
of a left-of-center
theemergence
partythatgainscontrolof thelegislativeand execuina waythatplaces
reformulation
ofsocialprograms
tivebranches,
andthesubsequent
and
ensures
that
transfer
on
human
formation
payments
capital
emphasis
expenditure
ingreatest
Thisprocessconstitutes
to individuals
needofincomesupport.
aredelivered
It does notmeanthat,ifone elereduction.
theideal typeof the"politics"of poverty
butrather
that
reduction
is impossible,
mentintheprocessis weakormissing,poverty
the
themostsuccessfulcountrieswill exhibitall threeelements.Table 2 summarizes
abouttheireffecton poverty
variablesexaminedin thisanalysisand theexpectations
levels.
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Effects
fortheAnalyses
Data SourcesandHypothesized
Table 2 VariableDescriptions,
ofPoverty
Levelsin LatinAmerica
Variable
Variable
Dependent
Poverty

IndependentVariables
controls
Methodological
Debtcrisis
Recovery

Description
ofhouseholdsthatlivebelowthe
Percentage
line.3
ECLAC-established
poverty

1982-1989
1990-2001

and Structural
Controls
Economic,Socio-Demographic,
PercapitaGDP inthousands
of 1995purchasing
GDP (percapita)
powerparitydollars.0
inconsumer
Inflation
Annualinflation
prices(percent).0
of
Sector
ofworkers
classifiedas informal
Informal
Percentage
d
laborforce.
non-agricultural
ofGDP.b
Debt
Externaldebtas a percentage
ofworking-aged
womenwho
FemaleLaborForce
Percentage
b
intheformallaborforce.a'
Participation
participate
as a percentofGDP.b
Totalexportsand imports
Trade
directinvestment
as a
Netinflowsofforeign
ForeignDirect
Investment
Inflows
percentofgrosscapitalformation.0
ofthelaborforcein industry.0
Industrial
Employment
Percentage
Estimated
Giniindex.e
Gini
EthnicHeterogeneirty
Dummyvariablescored1 ifethnicandracial
is at least20%, butnotmorethan80%.g
diversity
Politics& Policies
YearsofEducation
Health& Education
Spending
Social Security
&
WelfareSpending
Democracy
Ideological
Left-Right
CenterofGravity
ExecutiveIdeological
CenterofGravity

Averageyearsoftotaleducationforthe
population
aged 25 andolder.c
Healthandeducationspendingas a percentof
GDP. Value is thecumulative
averageofspending
on theseprograms/
Social security
andwelfarespendingas a percent
ofGDP.f
Cumulative
from1945to the
yearsofdemocracy
yearoftheobservation/
indexofideologicalcenterofgravity
Cumulative
inthelowerhousefrom1945to theyearofthe
observation
(see text)/
indexofideologicalcenterof
Cumulative
intheexecutivebranchfrom1945
gravity
to theyearoftheobservation
(see text)/

Hypothesized
impact
-

+/+
+
+
+/+/+
+

-

+/-

Sources:aUnitedNationsEconomicCommissionon LatinAmericaand theCaribbean(CEPAL) (various
years);bWorldBank (2003); cBarro& Lee (2000); internationalLabour Organization(variousyears);
et al.
eUN WiderInequality
Dataset(2005) [adjustments
madebyauthors];fHuber
et al. (2005); gDe Ferranti
[codingdonebyauthors].
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MeasuresofIndependentand DependentVariables
of householdslivingbelowthe
variablein thisstudyis thepercentage
The dependent
line.
The
data
are compiledfromECLAC
country-specific
poverty
ECLAC-generated
and
the
the
annual
Social
Panorama, span timeperiod1968 through
studies,primarily
2001.24The ECLAC measurewas chosenratherthanthecommonly
employedWorld
line
of
Bankinternational
powerparity(PPP) dollarsperday.
two-purchasing
poverty
measureis thatit permitsunbiased
The benefitof usingthetwoPPP dollars-per-day
criticizethemeasure,noting
Severalauthors,however,
cross-national
comparisons.25
in consumption
differences
it
and
does
not
consider
that is too static
patterns
important
contendthat,
and
Delamonica
and pricesbetweencountries.
Minujin,Vandemoortele,
as percapitaincomeincreases,itbecomesmorecostlyto purchasegoodsthatareneclife.The authorsarguethat"therelevanceofa linefixedat US$1
essaryforday-to-day
[PPP] perdayis graduallyerodedbyeconomicgrowthand itis notevenusefulat one
pointin timeto compare(or aggregate)theincidenceof povertyacrosscountries."26
linenotethemeasure'sweaknesses.
EvenscholarswhoemploytheWorldBankpoverty
ofthisreasonMorley,Fiszbein,Lee, andWoodstress:"thesimplicity
Psacharopoulos,
line]neglectsseveralpersistent
problems.... Age, sex,and
poverty
ing[thestandard
local customsinfluence
affectindividualnutritional
workenvironment
requirements;
specificfood
dietarychoice; whileregionalsupplyand demandpatternsdetermine
prices."27
Reddyand PoggecriticizetheWorldBank povertymeasureand arguethatit is
that"possessa common
linesforeach country
moreusefulto construct
uniquepoverty
Each poverty
linewouldreferto thelocal costof requireachievement
interpretation.
mentsof achievinga specificset of ends."28The authorsnotethat,if commonend
goals are specified,thendata can be comparedacrosstimeand space evenwhenthe
We agreewithReddyand Poggeand contendthat
povertylinesare country-specific.
fortheregionof LatinAmericathemeasurethatcomesclosestto thisgoal is thatprointheregion.The
lineforeach country
videdbyECLAC. ECLAC calculatesa poverty
line is based on thecost of a basketof foodand nonfooditems.Whilethebasketof
nutritional
(has commoncaloricandproteinendrequirement
goodsmeetsa minimum
offooditems,and
theavailability
it
national
also
reflects
consumption
patterns,
goals),
of countryrelativeprices.29Since commonstandardsare used in the construction
is
across
time
a
cross-national
and
lines,
comparison
legitimate.
specificpoverty
Thisstudyanalyzestheimpactofpolicy(measuredas socialspendingandaverage
outcomes.The measuresof soyearsof schoolingof theadultpopulation)on poverty
ofGDP arecompiledfromseveralsources.The seriesfor
cial spendingas a percentage
of thehealth
and welfarespendingis fromtheIMF. The construction
social security
andeducationseriesis explainedintheappendix.30
as cumuForthisarticle,healthandeducationspendinghavebeenoperationalized
and
whilesocial security
lativeaveragesfortheperiod1970to theyearofobservation,
395
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welfarespendinghavebeenmeasuredyearto year.This operationalization
providesa
better
theoretical
modeloftheimpactofsocial spendingon poverty
becausereturns
on
inhumancapitalaremostdiscernible
investments
overlongtimehorizons.Ittakesseveral yearsforgovernment
spendingon educationand healthto have an impacton
since
the
investments
movethrough
thesystem,
poverty
requirethatchildren
upgrading
In additionto thelong-term
skillsand enjoyingbetterhealthcare.
natureof theeffect,
inhealthandeducationwillbe strongest
incountries
thatmaintain
improvement
spendIn
for
of
time.
other
a
level
of
health
and
educationspendwords, high
ing longperiods
at reducing
as moderately
inginone yearwillnotbe as effective
poverty
highspending
overa longperiodof time.In thecase of pensionsand othertransfer
howprograms,
ofspendingis immediate
becausethepoliciesinvolvea cashpayment
to
ever,theeffect
and ittherefore
makestheoretical
senseto analyzetheimpactof social seindividuals,
basis.The twospending
curityand welfarespendingon a yearly(and noncumulative)
measuresareavailablefor97 ofthe106 country
years.
The measureof democracy
is takenfromRueschemeyer,
Stephens,and Stephens'
analysisof LatinAmericanand Caribbeanpoliticalregimes.Withtheirdefinitions,
coloniesand all formsof authoritarian
democracies
regimesare coded as 0, restricted
as .5,andfulldemocracies
as 1,andeachcountry's
scoreis cumulated
from1945tothe
Thiscumulative
measureis appropriate
fortesting
thetheoretical
yearofobservation.31
thatitis thestrength
ofthedemocratic
recordthatallowspartiesrepresenting
argument
theinterests
of theunderprivileged
to emerge,consolidate,
gainentryintothelegislature,anduse theirlegislative
positionto shapepolicy.
Partycodingsare an extensionof Michael Coppedge's projectthatsurveyed
countryexpertsto classifyall politicalpartiesthatcontestedelectionsforthelower
housesor constituent
assembliesin elevenLatinAmericanstates.32
Coppedge'scodingsdate back to 1912, and theclassificationschemecontainstwoprimarydimensionsand additionalsubcategories.
The firstdimensionin Coppedge'scodingscheme
divides partiesalong the left-right
ideological spectrum.The placementof each
partyon thiscleavageis establishedby consideringthesocial and economicpolicy
positionsof theparty.Coppedgesoughtto capturetheparty'sideologyand class apof growthand repeals throughan analysisof issue positionand theprioritization
distribution.
He thenfurther
dividestheleft-right
spectrumintofivesubcategories:
and right.The seconddimensionthatCoppedge
left,center-left,
center,center-right,
considersin his codingis the religious-secular
dividebetweenparties.He also includesthreenonclassifiable
other,and
categoriesin his codingscheme:personalist,
unknown.
Forcountry-years
thatoverlapped
withCoppedge'swork,hiscodingsareusedwith
one exception.
WhileCoppedgeclassifiedthePeronists
ofArgentina
as "other"forall
fortheperiod1945 to 1973,secular
years,theyare coded hereas secularcenter-left
centerfortheperiod1974to 1989,and secularcenter-right
from1990through
thepresent.33In addition,Coppedge'sworkis extendedbyadoptionof thecodingschemeto
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in the
classifyall partiesthatcontestedlowerhouse electionsforthe country-years
sample.34
oftheseatsheldby
ofeachpartyinthesample,theproportion
Afterclassification
For this
in
was
summed.35
the
for
each partycategory everycountry-year
analysis
the
same
on
the
left-right
position
analysis,thereligiousand secularpartiesoccupying
dimensionwerecombinedintofivecategories:right,centerright,center,center-left,
of thelowerhousewas
Foreach democratic
and left.36
composition
year,theleft-right
summarized
bya scale of thelegislativepartisanbalanceof power,calculatedaccordformula.
ingto thefollowing
Legislativepartisanbalance= 0*r+ .5*cr+ 1*c + 1.5*cl+ 2*1
centerofseatsinthelowerhouseheldbyright,
wherer,cr,c, cl,and1aretheproportion
Fornondemocratic
andleftparties,respectively.
center,
center-left,
years,all cateright,
duringperiodsof authoritarian
goriesare scoredas 0 becausepartieshad no influence
on poverty,
thelowerhouselegislative
rule.To modeltheimpactofpartisanship
partisan
becausetheimpactofpartiThisprocedureis important
balancescorewas cumulated.
in settingswherepartiesenjoyedsustainedperiwill be strongest
sanshipon poverty
in studiesof adods of legislativeinfluence.This facthas been well demonstrated
The lowerhouse legislativepartisanbalance score
vancedcapitalistwelfarestates.37
forall countriesin thesample.A
was cumulatedfrom1945to theyearof observation
oftheexecutivewas developed.
measureforpartyaffiliation
similarcumulative
authoritarian
The finalpoliticalvariabletestedis thepresenceofhighlyrepressive
1 for
a
were
coded
as
authoritarian
category,
separate
regimes
regimes.Repressive
withand
0
for
had
a
authoritarian
the
every
year
regime
repressive
everyyear country
or toleroutsucha regime,based on theextentof humanrightsviolationscommitted
fifteen
over
the
were
cumulated
scores
ated by theauthoritarian
Yearly
government.
of
of
the
the
to
to
the
of
observation,
impact repressive
capture fading
year
yearsprior
studies.Thesemodelsalso inovertime.38
The sourceswerecountry
authoritarianism
andeconomicvariablesthathavebeenfoundto be imporcludevarioussociostructural
inpreviousstudies.39
ofpoverty
tantpredictors
EstimationTechnique
fromeighteenLatin
An unbalancedpanel data set was used with 106 observations
CostaRica,the
American
Chile,
Colombia,
Brazil,
Bolivia,
countries,
including
Argentina,
DominicanRepublic,Ecuador,El Salvador,Guatemala,Honduras,Mexico,Nicaragua,
andVenezuela.Poverty
Peru,Uruguay,
Panama,Paraguay,
figureswereavailableonly
oftwoanda maximum
Therearea minimum
timeperiodsin each country.
forvarying
from
1968to 2001.
the
The
data
ofelevenobservations
span period
percountry.
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A centralproblemin estimating
modelsfrompaneldata is thattheasregression
across
observations
is unlikely
tobe satisfied.
As a
of
of
errors
sumption independence
standard
errorsfortheregression
coefficients.40
One apresultOLS producesincorrect
errorsin panel data assumesseriallycorrelatederrors
proachto deal withcorrelated
withineach unit(country)obeyinga unitspecificautoregressive
process(whichmay
to be the same acrossunits).This approachrequireswhat
optionallybe constrained
of cross-sections,
thatis, data strucStimsoncalls temporally
dominatedtime-series
turesconsistingof relativelyfew unitsobservedover manyequally spaced time
Sincetheaveragenumberof timepoints(six) is muchsmallerthanthenumpoints.41
berof units(eighteen),and theobservations
are notequallyspaced,thedata setused
hereprecludesthisapproach.
An alternative
was adopted,combining
of the
estimation
OLS estimation
strategy
which
consistent
estimates
of
the
coefficoefficients,
provides
regression
regression
estimator
of thestandarderrors.The standard
cients,withtheuse of a robust-cluster
or"sandwich"robustestimator
ofthevariancematrixofpaHuber-White
(noncluster)
in
errors
the
ofhetrameter
estimates
providescorrectstandard
presenceofanypattern
in
eroskedasticity
(unequalvariancesoftheerrorterms)butnot thepresenceof correelementsin thecovariancematrixof theerrors).42
latederrors(nonzerooff-diagonal
The robust-cluster
varianceestimator
is a variantof theHuber-White
robustestimator
thatremainsvalid(providescorrectcoverage)inthepresenceofanypattern
ofcorrelaserialcorrelation
andcorrelation
tionsamongerrorswithinunits,including
duetounitstandarderrorsare unaffected
Thus,therobust-cluster
specificcomponents.43
by the
stablecountry-specific
factorscausingcorrelation
presenceof unmeasured
amongerrorsof observations
forthesamecountry,
or forthatmatter
anyotherformof withinuniterrorcorrelation.
ofthestandard
errorsis impervious
to correlations
of
The robust-cluster
estimator
errorswithinclusters,
The latbutitrequireserrorstobe uncorrelated
betweenclusters.
terassumption
factorsaffect
thedependent
variablein
mightbe violatedifunmeasured
all unitsat thesamepointintime.Globaleconomicfluctuations,
suchas thedebtcrisis
effects.
To
periodin LatinAmericain the1980s,couldproducesuchcontemporaneous
evaluatethepotentialimpactof suchunmeasured
themodels
periodspecificfactors,
withindicator
wereestimated
variablesforthedebtcrisis(1982-89) and forthe 1990s
to 1968-82.
(1990-2000), theperiodof recovery;thebaselinecategorycorresponds
It is hypothesized
thatpovertywill increasein thedebtcrisisyears,and a nondirectionalhypothesis
is adoptedwithregardto thedifferences
betweenthebeforeand after
debtcrisisyears.In orderto checkforrobustness,
with
themodelswerealso estimated
in therobustcluster
standard
errors.All of thesignificant
coefficients
panelcorrected
in thepanelcorrected
estimations
werealso significant
The
standard
errorestimations.
robust-cluster
estimates
provedto be moreconservative.
A finalestimation
is theproblemof endogeneity
has
difficulty
giventhatpoverty
beenhypothesized
tobe a cause ofweakdemocracies.
Thisproblemis partlyaddressed
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It is a measureof democratic
natureof themeasureof democracy.
by thecumulative
sinceitis
cause
cannot
current
and
Nevertheless,
pastpoliticalhistory.
poverty
history,
the
coeffithat
the
to
is
correlated
that
current
pastpoverty, proposition
poverty
likely
theeffectof democracyon povertycannotbe recientsmaysomewhatoverestimate
oflegislative
balanceofpower,thereis supportforthe
giventheeffect
jected.However,
view thatdemocracyreducespovertyoverthe mediumand long runby
theoretical
of democracy
makingtheemergenceof partiesto theleftof centerpossible.Strength
and thelegislativepartisanbalancevariablewereveryhighlycorrelated
(r = .93) and
becauseofmulticollinearity.
couldnotbe enteredintothesameregression
Resultsand Discussion
The resultsof theanalysesare presentedin Table 3. Model 1 is theoriginalbaseline
modeland includesall thecontrolvariables.Since inclusionof thevariable"employcases and does notimin thebaselineresultsin theloss of fourteen
mentin industry"
it
is notsignificant,
since
the
variable
and
of
the
the
model,
capacity
prove predictive
The subsequent
was droppedfromtheanalysis,andModel2 was usedas thebaseline.44
of politicaland
modelspresentedin Table 3 buildon thebaselineand testa battery
model:averto
the
baseline
the
variables
Model
3
adds
variables.
policy
policy-related
on
health
and
cumulative
of
education,and
averagespending
age years education,
4
and
Model
adds
the
and
welfare.
on
social
policy
regimevariables,
security
spending
andmodel5 replaces
recordandrepressive
ofthedemocratic
authoritarianism,
strength
theregimevariableswithlong-term
partisanbalance.Model6 considersthe
legislative
whilemodel7 does
effectof thelegislativepartisanbalancewithoutsocial spending,
the
model8 presents
ofpartisanpower.Finally,
thesamewiththeexecutivedistribution
in
variation
on
cross-national
of
income
poverty.
inequality
impact
The ideal-typical
by the
politicalsequencedescribedearlieris largelyconfirmed
leftof
a
a
record
As
resultsof thisanalysis. expected, strong
democracy, long-term
crosscontribute
to
all
in
and
social
spending
leaningbalanceofpower thelegislature,
to Ross, thisstudyfindsthat
nationalvariationin povertylevels.Indeed,in contrast
forthisdiscrepis clearlygood forthepoor.45The mostlikelyexplanation
democracy
whereasthissetis
setofcountries
ancybetweenthestudiesis thatRoss' is a worldwide
this analysisuses an incomemeasureof
confinedto Latin America.Additionally,
The resultsofthisanalysisshowthatin
whileRoss focuseson infant
mortality.
poverty,
havebeengood forthe
thecase of LatinAmericaextendedperiodsof fulldemocracy
a
sectorsin LatinAmericabyproviding
poor.Democracyhas helpedunderprivileged
withinwhichthesegroupscouldorganizeandmobilizedemandsforbetter
prosetting
to polititheexistenceof politicalcompetition
tection.Moreover,
providesincentives
cians to be responsiveto suchdemands.A movefromthetenthto theninetieth
perrecordreducespoverty
centileon thedemocratic
points.46
by 10.4percentage
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As pointedout earlier,thedominantalternative
to democracyin LatinAmerica
not left-wingauthoritarianism.
since 1970 has been right-wing
authoritarianism,
authoritarianism
is
but
falls
shortof significance.
When
Repressive
correctly
signed
in
with
alternative
time
the
variable
remains
lags,
insignificant predictoperationalized
in LatinAmericanpoverty
levels.
ingdifferences
in models5 and 6 of Table 3 also confirmtheexpectation
The resultspresented
is
ofpartiesoftheleftrelativeto thecenterandrightinthelegislature
thatthestrength
ofpoverty
levelsintheregion.The legislative
a significant
andnegativepredictor
partiandnegativepredictor
ofpoverty
levelswhensocialexpensanbalanceis a significant
diturevariablesare excludedfromthemodel.If spendingvariablesare included,howThis resultsuggeststhatthe
ever,thepartisanbalanceof powerloses itssignificance.
welfarepoliciesto favorthepoorestsectors
leftinfluences
levelsbystructuring
poverty
ofsociety.
in LatinAmerica,wherepartiesare often
This resultis particularly
important
It is oftenassumedthattheprevalence
nature.47
notedfortheirweakandpersonalistic
of clientelistic
exchangesbetweenpoliticiansand votersin LatinAmericahas underminedtheabilityof leadersto engagein programmatic
politics.Evidencepresented
differences
here,however,
amongLatinAmericanparsuggeststhatthereareimportant
to
andright.
The evidencefurther
tiesoftheleft,center,
suggeststhat,despitepressures
conform
to theneoliberaleconomicmodel,leftpartiescontinueto exhibitdifferences
withregardto thecharacter
of social policyformation.
fromtheirrightist
counterparts
There
of theexecutivefallsjust shortof significance.
partisanship
Interestingly,
thisfinding.The strongagenda-setting
are twowaysof interpreting
powerof Latin
or parAmericanpresidents
couldbe at leastpartiallyconstrained
bythelegislature,
in
on
the
executive
the
works
than
level;
differently
representatisanship
legislature
tivesand senatorsare less likelyto stakeout centristpositionsthantheirexecutive
counterparts.
describedby this
The finalelementof thepoliticalprocessof povertyreduction
framework
involvesthedesignof socialpolicy.Surprisingly,
themostdirect
theoretical
on
health
and
measureof humancapitalinvestment,
education,is
publicexpenditure
in
of
levels
Latin
America.48
This
fact
should
notbe
nota significant
predictor poverty
in
in
human
is
to
mean
that
investment
capital unimportant reducing
interpreted
madeby
thatspendinglevelsdo nottellmuchabouttheeffort
levels,butrather
poverty
to
or
human
capitalat the
directly indirectly
by improving
governments fightpoverty
in
the
results
Table
3
bottomof theincomedistribution.
Indeed,
suggestthattheway
levels.
is
allocated
matters
more
than
spending
expenditure
The resultsconfirmthatan effective
educationpolicy,definedas programsthat
is a significant
andnegative
increasetheaverageyearsof schoolingofthepopulation,
that
extends
the
of
levels.
Education
spending
provisionof public
predictor poverty
in
forteachers
subsidies
to
risk
and
invests
schools,
training
high
preschool,provides
found
to
increasethe
in lowincomeschoolsareall expenditure
that
have
been
patterns
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in LatinAmericanschools.These sortsof educationpoliciesare
retention
of students
in sucha wayas to privilegetherisksfaceffective
becausetheystructure
expenditure
children
at
the
bottom
of
the
income
distribution,
namely,earlyschoolabandoning
ment.The factthattheaveragenumberofyearsofeducationis a significant
and negativepredictor
of LatinAmericanpoverty
levelsunderscores
thevalueofwell-designed
theeffect
ofthisvariableis quitelarge:
educationpolicyinreducing
Moreover,
poverty.
in theaverageyearsofedua movefromthetenthpercentile
to theninetieth
percentile
in
cationresultsinan 11.0 percentage
reduction
point
poverty.49
Theresultsinmodels3 and8 ofTable3 also suggestthatincomesupport
policies- are important
in Latin
social security
andwelfarespending
toolsin reducingpoverty
as it suggeststhat,despitethewell-known
strucAmerica.This findingis interesting
such
turalinequalities
builtintotheregion'stransfer
does
systems,
spending
providean
of
The
fact
that
the
amount
of
social
level protection
againstpoverty.
security
important
whendemocracy
is addedto themodel(model
andwelfarespendingis notsignificant
of spendingis moreimportant
thantheoverallamountof
4) indicatesthatthestructure
spending.Democraciesreducepovertyin partby structuring
spendingto benefitthe
lowerincomegroups.
A resultthatoffersadditionalsupportto thepoliticaltheoryof poverty
reduction
advancedin thisarticleis thatincomeinequality,
as measuredbytheGini index,is a
andpositivepredictor
ofpoverty
levels.Interestingly,
theGiniis significant
significant
andthepartisanbalanceofpoweraredroppedfromtheequation.
onlywhendemocracy
This resultsuggeststhatone wayin whichdemocratic
parregimesand left-of-center
is byshrinking
thegap betweenrichandpoor.
tiescontribute
to lowerlevelsofpoverty
anda left-leaning
balanceofpartisanpowerhavebeenfoundto deIndeed,democracy
press inequalityin Latin America.50These findingsconfirmthatlong periodsof
sectorscan voice demandsand
democracy
providea settingin whichunderprivileged
leftpartiescan emergeto restructure
welfarepoliciesin a waythatredistributes
rights
to thelowersectoroftheincomedistribution.
The effects
ofthecontrolvariablesincludedinthemodelsarerelatively
unsurprisand negativeimpacton poverty
percapitaGDP has a significant
ing.As anticipated,
and effective
educationpollevels,buttheeffectis somewhatsmallerthandemocracy
inpercapitaGDP resulting
in
icy,witha movefromthetenthtotheninetieth
percentile
in poverty.
a 8.3 percentage
On theotherhand,thesize oftheinformal
pointreduction
butin theoppositedirection.
sectorhas thesamemagnitude
effect
Thus,sincein Latin
inGDP hasbeenaccompaniedbygrowth
inthe
Americainthelasttwodecadesgrowth
in
informal
economicdevelopment
modelhas beenunsuccessful
sector,theprevailing
on itsown.
reducing
poverty
Ethnicdiversity
has a consistently
statistically
positiveimpacton poverty,
except
wheninequality
increases
is includedintheequation.Thisresultsuggeststhatdiversity
povertylevelsthrough
higherlevelsof inequality.
Finally,thedebtcrisishas a highly
and consistent
levels,and evenin therecovery
significant
impacton poverty
periodof
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the 1990spoverty
levelsremainedhigherthanin the 1970s.The disappearance
of the
effect
of
the
1990s
in
when
is
the
that
the
inesignificant
inequality
equationsuggests
of
the
debt
crisis
account
for
the
of
galitarian
consequences
policies
persistence higher
levels.
poverty
Conclusion
This studyshedsnewlighton theissue of cross-national
variationin poverty
in Latin
America.The findings
underscore
thesignificant
impactofpartisanpowerandregime
in poverty
levels.The importance
ofthedemocratic
record
typein shapingdifferences
forpovertylevels is one factorcontributing
to an explanationof the highlevels of
in LatinAmericaas comparedto advancedindustrial
democracies.The result
poverty
As democracy
theregion,
mayalso be reasonforsomeoptimism.
deepensthroughout
levelsshoulddecline.
poverty
The analysisalso pointsto theimportance
of educationin liftingcitizensout of
Theseresultshaveimportant
forbothpoliticiansand scholarsof
poverty.
implications
LatinAmericanpoliticaleconomy.Withrespectto policymakers,
politiciansand technocratsmustbe waryof social policyreforms
thatmightsacrificecitizens'access to
education.Indeed,one of theprimary
meansof reducingpovertyinvolvesincreasing
thelevelof education.Thus,cutbacksin theseprograms
couldhavedisastrouseffects
forthewell-being
oftheregionin thelongerrun.By contrast,
policiesthatseekto exrepandchildren's
yearsof schoolingcouldhavean extremely
largeeffecton poverty
duction.
The importance
ofaverageyearsofeducationindetermining
cross-national
differencesin poverty
has implications
forsocial policybeyondtheeducationsector.In recentyearsLatinAmericahas witnessed
theexpansionofa newbreedofsocialpolicies,
conditionalcash transfers,
thatuses incomesupplements
to generateincentivesfor
familiesto keep childrenenrolledin schooland to use medicalservices.51
Programs
such as Bolsa Escola (Brazil), Chile Soldiario,PANES (Uruguay),and Progresa
as a prerequisite
forthepayment
ofthecash sub(Mexico) stipulateschoolattendance
In
this
these
seek
to
income
reduction
sidy.
way,
policies
promotepoverty
byproviding
and
the
of
education
of
the
These
support boosting averageyears
population.
findings
aretrulyeffective
at increasing
schoolattendance,
suggestthat,iftheseprograms
they
couldhavesignificant
effects.
welfare-enhancing
thefindingaboutthesignificant
effectof social
Additionally,
poverty-reducing
and
welfare
that
transfer
security
spendingsuggests
existing
systemsare somewhat
effective
at protecting
thepoor.Thus,ratherthaneliminatesuch programs,
policymakersshouldworkto reformsystemsso thatspendingis moreprogressive.The
aforementioned
conditionaltransfer
programsare one promisingway of improving
transfer
systems.
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forscholarsof LatinAmerican
The resultsof thisanalysisalso haveimplications
underscores
theneedto bringpolithe
First
and
foremost,
analysis
politicaleconomy.
on ecoticsback in to researchon theregion'spoverty
problem.Focusingexclusively
nomicfactorsor evenon economicand policyfactorsis insufficient.
Rather,a more
completeexplanationof variationin povertylevelsacrosscountriesand acrosstime
ofpowerbetweenpolitandthedistribution
to theregimetrajectory
mustpayattention
weakpartysystemsand
ical parties.It is tellingthat,despiteLatinAmerica'sgenerally
thatpoliticsand paran abundanceof personalistic
leaders,thesemodelsdemonstrate
a greatdeal.
tiescontinueto matter
This studyis notthefirstresearchon LatinAmericanpoliticaleconomyto find
evidencein supportof systematic
Othershavepresented
politpoliticsto be important.
So far,partiesand mass attitudes
ical effectsin economicand social policymaking.52
havebeenstudiedmostlybyscholarsand
towards
partiesandotherpoliticalinstitutions
as a politicalsystem.
withthesurvivalandqualityofdemocracy
concerned
institutions
concernedwithpovertyand inequalityneed to takeparties
Scholarsand institutions
as well.
moreseriously,
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